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 BASIC INCOMPATIBILITIES BETWEEN EVOLUTIONARY AND
 BEHAVIORAL ARCHAEOLOGY
 Michael J. O'Brien, R. Lee Lyman, and Robert D. Leonard
 Schiffer (1996) recently proposed that, despite some incompatibilities, considerable common ground exists between behav-
 ioral archaeology and evolutionary, or selectionist, archaeology. He concludes that there is no fundamental reason why the
 two approaches cannot work in concert to explain human behavioral change. There are, howev'et; several important reasons
 Vwhy the thwo programs, at least as currently conceived, cannot work together in any thoroughly integrated frishion. Although
 both programs employ inference, behavioral archaeology conflates the distinct roles of configurational and immanent prop-
 erties, searches for nomothetic answers to questions about human behaviot; overlooks historical contingency when inferring
 and explaining the nature of past behavior, and in some cases seems to frill back on vitalism as the mechanism of change.
 Evolutionary archaeology employs immanent properties inferentially, explicitly acknowledges the importance of the histori-
 cal contingencies of configurational properties, explains human behavior as being time- and spacebound, and calls upon
 selection and drift (transmission) as the mechanisms of change. Any attempt to integrate the tiwo approaches must begin by
 addressing these basic differences.
 Schiffer (1996) recientemente ha propuesto que, a pesar de algunas incompatibilidades, existen considerables puntos en comnin
 entre la arqiueologfa conductual y la arqueologfa evolucionista, o seleccionista. Conclutye que no existen razones findametales
 por las que estas dos perspectivas no puedan trabajar en conjunto para explicar los cambios del comportamiento hurmano.
 Existen, a pesar de todo, varias razones importantes por lo cual estas dos escuelas, al menos comno se les ha concebido hasta
 ahora, no pueden trabajarjuntas bajo ningfin planteamniento integrado. Aunque las dos escuelas emplean inferencias, la arque-
 ologfa conductual conjuga el papel distintivo de las propiedades configuracionales e imnanentes, busca respuestas nomoteticas a
 las preguntas sobre el comportamiento humano, pasa por alto las contingencias hist6ricas al inferir y explicar la naturaleza del
 comportamiento pasado, y en algunas casos parece recaer en el vitalismo como mecanismo del cambio. La arqueologfa evolu-
 cionista emplea inferencialmente las propiedades inmanentes, reconoce explicitamente la importancia de las contingencias
 hist6ricas en la conflguraci6n de las propiedades, explica el comportamniento humano como finico en un tiempo y espacio deter-
 minado, y considera a la selecci6n y la transmisi6n como los mecanismos responsables del cambio. Cualquier intento de inte-
 grar estas dos escuelas debe comenzar por resolver estas diferencias ba'sicas.
 R ecently, Schiffer (1996) pointed out what
 he saw as specific areas of concordance
 between evolutionary archaeology and
 behavioral archaeology, positing that "there is no
 fundamental reason why these two programs can-
 not work in concert to achieve the goal of explain-
 ing behavioral (or evolutionary) change in human
 societies" (Schiffer 1996:643). Schiffer is the
 prime architect of the behavioral archaeology pro-
 gram (Schiffer 1995a) and, together with col-
 leagues and students at the University of Arizona
 (e.g., Reid et al. 1974, 1975; Skibo et al. 1995), has
 produced the majority of articles and books that
 take a behavioral approach to understanding the
 archaeological record. He also has been more than
 accommodating in allowing evolutionists to pub-
 lish in journals and series that he edits; thus he has
 had to read not only the manuscripts submitted but
 also the reviews solicited during the editorial
 process. As a result, he has more than a passing
 familiarity with evolutionary archaeology, and
 hence his observations of possible overlap
 between it and behavioral archaeology are worth
 considering in detail.
 We agree with some of Schiffer's observations
 and arguments, but disagree with others. The
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 points of disagreement underscore deep differ-
 ences between the two approaches. Both evolu-
 tionary and behavioral archaeology seek to explain
 humankind's past, and in some cases the data
 requirements are the same (O'Brien and Holland
 1995b), but there are significant differences in
 epistemology, several of which are well discussed
 in Schiffer's paper. Hence, we address them only
 in passing and focus primary attention on meta-
 physical differences between evolutionism and
 behavioralism-differences that at present cannot
 be resolved given the contrasting manner in which
 behavioralists and evolutionists construct their
 explanations of the past.
 History, Evolutionary Archaeology, and
 Behavioral Archaeology
 Schiffer focuses the majority of attention on the
 work of Dunnell, correctly claiming that evolu-
 tionary archaeology "had its proximate roots in
 [Dunnell's] writings ... especially his 1980 paper
 in Advances in Archaeological Method and
 Theory" (Schiffer 1996:646). The 1980 paper to
 which Schiffer refers (Dunnell 1980) was
 Dunnell's (1996a:x) "second major foray into evo-
 lution and sociobiology," the first having been a
 conference paper presented in 1978 (Dunnell
 1996b). Other papers written late in the 1970s
 show the growing influence of Darwinism on
 Dunnell's thinking (e.g., Dunnell 1978; Dunnell
 and Wenke 1980). There are two points here. First,
 Dunnell's thinking was not fully developed in the
 1970s the Advances paper was written, as
 Dunnell (1996a:x) put it, by a "neophyte." Second,
 Dunnell has yet to produce a thorough program-
 matic statement on how to implement his version
 of evolutionary archaeology. What Dunnell
 (1996a:xi) takes as his "best" piece of evolutionary
 archaeology work is an exploration of artifact vari-
 ation (Dunnell and Feathers 1991)-an extremely
 critical factor within evolutionary archaeology that
 has prompted him to remark on more than one
 occasion (e.g., Dunnell 1989:46) that archaeology
 must develop units of measurement and descrip-
 tion commensurate with theory.
 Most of Dunnell's published statements either
 are directed to particular issues within the larger
 context of the evolutionary archaeology program
 (e.g., Dunnell 1995) or are so general that little
 critical detail is included (e.g., Dunnell 1989,
 1992a, 1992b). One must, therefore, to some
 degree interpret his writings and fill in apparent
 gaps. We are aided in this task by our collabora-
 tions with him (e.g., Dunnell and Leonard 1998;
 Lyman et al. 1997; O'Brien and Dunnell 1998),
 yet our collective view does not precisely mirror
 Dunnell's. Nor should it necessarily do so. But we
 agree with Dunnell that "one cannot point to a
 complete and robust theory [of evolutionary
 archaeology] at this point in time .... [T]here are
 still important theoretical issues that require reso-
 lution" (Dunnell 1989:42). Biological evolution-
 ary theory cannot simply be lifted wholesale from
 that realm and applied to sherds, post molds, and
 arrowheads, just as Darwin's theory could not be
 lifted from On the Origin of Species and applied
 wholesale to the fossil record.
 These various facts result in Schiffer commit-
 ting what we view as errors. His description of
 Dunnell's (1989) discussion of waste behavior-
 specifically the Woodland-period mortuary cults
 of the eastern United States that left behind highly
 visible burial mounds as being "almost as
 behavioral as [a discussion written by] behav-
 ioralists" (Schiffer 1996:650) is a case in point.
 Dunnell (1989:46-49) stated explicitly what the
 limitations were of what he was doing.
 Evolutionary archaeology provided only a "gross"
 understanding of the existence of "waste," and his
 discussion only served to exemplify the sorts of
 insights that might result from use of evolutionary
 theory. The scenario provided was thus of "lim-
 ited value" and only suggested the "potential" of
 evolutionary archaeology to help explain the
 archaeological record; in particular, it indicated
 which variables were relevant to such scenarios.
 Schiffer probably would argue that when fleshed
 out, the scenario would be behavioral, and he
 would be correct, since human behaviors created
 the waste. No evolutionary archaeologist ever
 argued otherwise (O'Brien and Holland 1995b).
 More importantly, Dunnell (1989) emphasized
 that (1) if it is granted that artifacts are part of the
 phenotype, then one must be clear on what makes
 up an artifact; (2) relevant variables had not yet
 been described within an evolutionary theory
 applicable to cultural phenomena such as arti-
 facts; (3) appropriate units for measuring relevant
 variables in the empirical realm had not been
 identified and described; and (4) identifying both
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 the variables and the units must be commensurate
 with theory building. Numerous efforts by many
 individuals have been made in these directions
 subsequent to publication of Dunnell's article (see
 references in O'Brien 1996b), but many issues
 have not been resolved.
 What Is Evolutionary Archaeology?
 The premise underlying Darwinian evolutionary
 archaeology is, as Schiffer (1996:646) points out,
 that objects occurring in the archaeological record,
 because they were phenotypic, were shaped by the
 same evolutionary processes as were the somatic
 features of their makers and users. This is a short-
 hand way of saying that the possessors of the
 objects were acted on by evolutionary processes.
 Under this perspective, evolution is viewed as the
 differential persistence of discrete variants
 (Dunnell 1980:38), regardless of the scale of "vari-
 ant" being defined. Evolutionary archaeology
 involves (1) measuring variation that is, dividing
 it into discrete sets of empirical units (groups)
 using ideational units (classes); (2) tracking vari-
 ants through time and across space to produce a
 historical narrative about lineages of particular
 variants; and (3) explaining the differential persis-
 tence of individual variants comprising lineages in
 particular time-space contexts. Selection is a key
 concept in evolutionary theory, though in modern
 Darwinian evolutionary theory, selection is only
 one evolutionary process that works on variation.
 Few would doubt that selection is the greatest
 molder of lineages, but it still acts in tandem with
 other processes such as drift and mutation.
 Selection is the mechanism that drives much evo-
 lutionary change and is external to the system
 (organisms or cultures) itself. Within Darwinian
 theory, it serves as a testable explanation of change
 (Leonard and Reed 1993).
 Evolutionary archaeology has many parallels to
 modern paleobiology (Lyman and O'Brien 1998).
 It is geared toward providing Darwinian-like
 explanations of the archaeological record, just as
 paleobiologists explain the paleontological record.
 There are two steps: first, build cultural lineages,
 and second, construct explanations for those lin-
 eages being the way they are (O'Hara 1988;
 Szalay and Bock 1991). Both steps must employ
 concepts embedded within Darwinian evolution-
 ary theory, such as lineage (a line of development
 owing its existence to heritability), natural selec-
 tion (a mechanism of change), a transmission
 mechanism (which itself is a source of new vari-
 ants), invention/innovation (another source of new
 variants), and heritability (denoting continuity,
 such that similarity is homologous). The last
 ensures that we are examining change within a lin-
 eage rather than merely convergence, in which
 case similarity is of the analogous sort.
 Within paleobiology, some of the best historical
 studies were written by Simpson (e.g., 1937a,
 1937b, 1937c). Some might question why we refer
 to such "ancient writings," but what Simpson had
 to say in the 1930s and 1940s is as relevant today
 as it was six decades ago (Gould 1980; LaPorte
 1983). Some debate has recently arisen as to
 whether a Simpson-like view is the most appropri-
 ate one to adopt in paleobiology (e.g., Gould
 1995a, 1995b), and some have, to be sure, adopted
 (allegedly [see LaPorte 1983]) different views
 (e.g., Gould and Eldredge 1993), but the important
 point is that we view these debates as particularly
 germane to what we see as the central objective of
 evolutionary archaeology.
 We favor definitions of evolution such as "any
 net directional change or any cumulative change in
 the characteristics of organisms or populations
 over many generations in other words, descent
 with modification. It explicitly includes the origin
 as well as the spread of alleles, variants, trait val-
 ues, or character states. Evolution may occur as a
 result of natural selection, genetic drift, or both"
 (Endler 1986:5; see also Richards 1992). Thus,
 trait variation and inheritance are required for evo-
 lutionary change to occur, but fitness differences
 are not; the last is only required for evolution via
 natural selection. Such a definition explicitly
 incorporates both style and function (sensu
 Dunnell 1978) as kinds of variants of archaeologi-
 cal phenomena. Given this definition, we prefer
 the methods of evolutionary study used by
 Gingerich (1991), Simpson (1944, 1975), and
 Szalay and Bock (1991) to understand the paleon-
 tological record (Lyman and O'Brien 1998). We
 do not deny that what is known as punctuated
 equilibrium (Eldredge and Gould 1972; Gould and
 Eldredge 1993) is valuable, nor do we deny its
 potential applicability to archaeology (e.g.,
 Rosenberg 1994). In part, our preference for ear-
 lier methods rather than, say, those favored under
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 punctuated equilibrium, resides in the much
 greater temporal resolution of the archaeological
 record. This is not to imply that the archaeological
 record is somehow qualitatively or quantitatively
 more complete than the paleontological record; the
 problems with both records are remarkably similar
 (see overview in Gould 1995a). But both records
 provide something to which their respective col-
 laborators dealing with living organisms-
 whether people or fruit flies do not have access.
 And that is, simply, time.
 As Gould (1995a:4) observed, "the short time
 scale of Drosophila experiments, pigeon breeding,
 and improvement of crop plants [may provide]
 direct evidence for the efficacy of selective
 processes," but these processes may or may not be
 applicable to "time's vastness." Gould is in part
 arguing that Darwinian theory must be modified
 (his and Eldredge's punctuated equilibrium added)
 to account for the whole of the paleontological
 record. The important part of Gould's message is
 that we need not bother studying the fossil
 record either paleontological or archaeologi-
 cal if we can see all evolutionary processes in a
 petrie dish or among a group of college students.
 Evolution is historical it takes place over time
 and contingency bound (Beatty 1995), meaning
 that it is conditioned by what happened at earlier
 points. Thus, the central objective of paleobiolo-
 gists and archaeologists is to determine and
 explain the history the evolutionary lineages of
 the phenomena they study. We believe most behav-
 ioral archaeologists would agree with this.
 What Is Behavioral Archaeology?
 Schiffer and other practitioners of behavioral
 archaeology claim to provide a richer and more
 complete picture of the past than evolutionary
 archaeologists do: "[B]ehavioral theory, immature
 though it remains, facilitates the fashioning of his-
 torical narratives that are both richly contextual-
 ized and audience friendly. More significantly, a
 behavioral narrative is centered on the actual activ-
 ities of past people" (Schiffer 1995b:34). Certainly
 behavioral archaeology provides a picture that is
 more anthropologically friendly, given its focus on
 human activities, than evolutionary archaeology
 does. But to argue that "the focus of theory build-
 ing in archaeology is ... on what people actually
 do (and did) in specific activities" (Schiffer
 1995b:35) seems to us little more than a holdover
 from Phillips's (1955:246-247) statement that
 "New World archaeology is anthropology or it is
 nothing." Why archaeology should be anything
 other than archaeology is never specified other
 than noting that artifacts are the products of
 humans-by Phillips, Schiffer, or anyone else who
 aligns with this position.
 Schiffer (1995b:24) states that the "behavioral-
 ist demands that historical narratives rest. . . on a
 foundation of well-confirmed behavioral princi-
 ples." But he also states that constructing behav-
 ioral principles or laws "was never viewed by
 behavioralists as archaeology's final goal. Rather,
 behavioral inferences provide the basis for gener-
 ating a view of the past compatible with a particu-
 lar theoretical stance: the behavioralist premise
 that the basis of human societies is their complete
 reliance on complex and intimate relationships
 between people and artifacts. The study of such
 relationships, in all times and places, can, behav-
 ioralists maintain, lead to the creation of distinc-
 tive social theory in archaeology" (Schiffer
 1995b:34). We have no dissatisfaction with the
 "behavioralist premise," but there are two reasons
 we cannot agree that constructing "behavioral the-
 ory to explain variation and change in human
 behavior, conceived as people-artifact interactions,
 is archaeology's highest scientific calling"
 (Schiffer 1995b:35). First, behavioral theory
 appears to be merely a set of empirical generaliza-
 tions; second, artifacts, not human behavior, make
 up the archaeological record.
 Behavioral theory is supposed to do two things:
 (1) improve "behavioral inference" so that it is
 "sound," thereby making the writing of narratives
 of behavioral history "rigorous," and (2) answer
 "with credible theories and laws, the general ques-
 tions raised in specific [historical] narratives"
 (Schiffer 1995b:34). The first is accomplished by
 generating "lawlike statements that, along with
 other kinds of information, link observations on
 the archaeological record to behaviors of the past
 (e.g., Schiffer 1972, 1976)," and by developing a
 "nomothetic understanding of material culture
 dynamics" (Schiffer 1995b:22). Such nomothetic
 principles are "required for reconstructing a
 behavioral past" (Schiffer 1995b:23) and appar-
 ently constitute the basis for building behavioral
 theory. Historical narratives are "plausible"
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 because they entail "theorylike or lawlike general-
 izations" in the structure of an often-implicit
 "nomothetic apparatus" (Schiffer 1995b:28).
 An example of an underlying premise of a
 behavioral theory is that "an artifact's performance
 characteristics cannot all achieve high values in
 every use activity" (Schiffer 1995b:29). A Swiss
 army knife can be used to do lots of things, none of
 them "in the most effective manner," and thus this
 artifact represents "compromises in activity perfor-
 mance" (Schiffer 1995b:30). The favored behav-
 ioral variable in this case is the transportability of a
 tool, which is "expectable when there is high user
 mobility and limited transport capability" (Schiffer
 1995b:30). High mobility and limited transport
 capability are certainly behavioral, but do general-
 ized tools always denote such behaviors?
 Behavioral theory doesn't tell us, because the
 mobility-transport capability equation is an empiri-
 cal generalization founded in common sense and
 denying any contingencies of particular behavioral
 contexts. Darwinian evolution provides a theoreti-
 cal understanding of such a tool by noting that
 design constraints typically result in things arti-
 facts or organisms not attaining all-around opti-
 mality (e.g., Gans 1988, 1993; Gould 1989); that is,
 compromises are always being made. Whether
 high mobility, limited transport, or some other fac-
 tor results in the production of such a thing is his-
 torically contingent what we term a historical
 configuration (see below). Why was such a tool
 built in a particular time-space position? Evolution-
 ary archaeology seeks an answer in two arenas:
 selective context and evolutionary history.
 Behavioral archaeology comprises the recon-
 struction of behaviors, arranging them in a histori-
 cal sequence and then explaining that sequence in
 behavioral terms. Whether or not the sequence also
 comprises a lineage in a Darwinian sense is not
 addressed by behavioral archaeology. Why?
 Because the critical distinction between homolo-
 gous and analogous similarities is not mentioned
 in behavioral archaeology theory; thus, a historical
 narrative may result, but it need not be an evolu-
 tionary narrative. That is, a temporal sequence may
 be produced under the behavioral archaeology pro-
 gram, but there is no apparent attempt to ensure
 that it is also an evolutionary lineage or a heri-
 tability-dependent sequence (Lyman and O'Brien
 1997). Further, given the empirical generalization-
 driven approach of behavioral archaeology in con-
 junction with the general absence of a concept of
 style, evolutionary archaeology suggests that
 behavioral archaeology explanations of Swiss
 army knives will be strictly functional (e.g., Gould
 1997; O'Brien and Holland 1992).
 Evolutionary archaeologists also wonder how
 the reconstructions of behavioral archaeology are
 tested, since they are inductions or inferences.
 Dunnell (1989:43-44), for example, notes that by
 allowing such reconstructions, "[r]elations
 between behavior and material must be invariant if
 they are to serve as timeless, spaceless rules for
 reconstruction" (see O'Brien and Holland 1995b).
 In other words, a particular structure of particular
 archaeological stuff in a particular context always
 and everywhere denotes a particular behavior. In
 short, equifinality is not a problem for behavioral
 archaeology because, given sufficient actualistic
 research, a modem analog for every human behav-
 ior that has ever occurred in the past can be found.
 Common Ground
 There are three areas of agreement between behav-
 ioral archaeology and evolutionary archaeology.
 First, both programs recognize the importance of
 human behavior in the context of archaeology.
Behavioral archaeologists and few if any evolu-
 tionists would disagree with Mayr's (1973:388)
 assertion that behavior "is perhaps the strongest
 selection pressure operating in the animal king-
 dom." Second, as Schiffer points out, identifying
 and tracking variation evident in the archaeologi-
 cal record is basic to evolutionary archaeology.
 But the isolation and measurement of variation is
 not the purview solely of evolutionists. As one of
 us has stated repeatedly (e.g., O'Brien and Holland
 1995a, 1995b), when Schiffer and his colleagues
 and students break clay test tiles or carry out myr-
 iad other experiments in the Laboratory for
 Traditional Technology at the University of
 Arizona (e.g., Schiffer 1990; Schiffer and Skibo
 1987; Schiffer et al. 1994; Skibo et al. 1989; Vaz
 Pinto et al. 1987), they are carrying out the same
 experiments that evolutionary archaeology
 requires (e.g., Brandon 1994) in order to under-
 stand variation in perfornance characteristics of
 objects found in the archaeological record. As
 O'Brien and Holland (1995b: 144) point out, tech-
 nological and functional analyses of how objects
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 were made and used are important in evolutionary
 archaeology. Explanations of past behavior "are
 derived directly from experimental evidence
 viewed against the archaeological context contain-
 ing the materials being examined. We contend that
 this kind of research agenda-one based on exper-
 imental evidence [leading to what we here term
 mechanical inference] will allow us to begin to
 understand not only the evolutionary trajectories
 of the humans responsible for the technological
 products but also the nature of selective regimes"
 (O'Brien and Holland 1995b: 144).
 The third point of agreement concerns how
 things in the archaeological record are viewed.
 Basic to evolutionary archaeology is the view that
 artifacts represent "the hard parts of the behavioral
 segment of [past] phenotypes" (Dunnell 1989:44;
 see Leonard and Jones 1987). When artifacts were
 made and used, they were as much a part of human
 phenotypes as nests and log dams are parts of bird
 and beaver phenotypes, respectively (O'Brien and
 Holland 1995b). Extending the phenotype
 (Dawkins 1990) to include nonsomatic features is,
 as Schiffer points out, something that appeals to
 behavioral archaeology because it emphasizes the
 behaviors that result in creation of the objects. Yet
 Schiffer does not follow through on the evolution-
 ary implications of this notion. He argues that
 "evolutionary theory itself cannot be rewritten in
 archaeological context terms: sherds were not part
 of anyone's phenotype (unless reused), yet a cook-
 ing pot a systemic-context entity operationalized
 through behavioral inference was" (Schiffer
 1996:649). Later, he (Schiffer 1996:653-654)
 devotes a page and a half to discussing "Appro-
 priate Units and Scales of Selection." The state-
 ment on sherds and the later discussion of units
 and scales are incompatible with each other from
 our perspective.
 If we paraphrase one of Dunnell's (1980:88)
 statements that Schiffer (1996:649) isolates, pale-
 obiologists have made significant strides in rewrit-
 ing evolutionary theory "in terms of variables that
 are empirical in the [fossil] record." Recall that
 Darwin made minimal reference to the fossil
 record (see papers in Nitecki and Nitecki 1992).
 Paleobiologists have had to develop a suite of
 terms some borrowed from functional biology
 such as homolog, synapomorph, autapomorph,
 and the like-to denote the variables requisite to
 applying Darwin's theory to the fossil record. Each
 variable has a particular significance for determin-
 ing evolutionary-that is, phylogenetic history,
 and each has particular, theoretically founded,
 empirical manifestations and distributions within
 the fossil record. Archaeology has only Willey's
 (1953:363) axiom that "typological similarity
 [indicates] cultural relatedness." In several
 respects, this puts the cart before the horse, for as
 Simpson (1961:69) pointed out when a similar
 axiom was in use in paleobiology, "individuals do
 not belong in the same taxon because they are sim-
 ilar, but they are similar because they belong to the
 same taxon." The significance of this statement is
 difficult to overemphasize.
 Following Schiffer's reasoning, sherds are not
 part of the phenotype, because a sherd has behav-
 ioral relevance only when it is in the systemic con-
 text; otherwise it is trash. By the same reasoning,
 paleobiologists would be surprised to learn that a
 fossilized fragment of a humerus or a single tooth
 is not part of an organism's phenotype because the
 organism is dead. Sherds have attributes temper-
 ing agent, wall thickness, and so forth any of
 which, at one time or another, could have been
 functional. Conversely, any or all could, at one
 time or another, have been functionally neutral
 (O'Brien et al. 1994). These attributes are part of a
 human's phenotype, just as the color of a mam-
 mal's hair as represented by a single hair follicle is
 part of that organism's phenotype, whether or not
 the hair is attached to the living organism.
 Schiffer's purely behavioral focus has turned
 attention away from some of his own most astute
 observations namely, those regarding the impor-
 tance of the scales of units on which evolutionary
 processes work. There are other differences
 between evolutionary and behavioral archaeology,
 and we turn now to some of the most important
 ones.
 Fundamental Differences
 Those who have more than a passing familiarity
 with the literature on evolutionary archaeology
 will recognize much of the following. However,
 given that what we discuss seems to be the major
 stumbling block to understanding this archaeology
 and how it differs from other approaches, and that
 critics of evolutionary archaeology (e.g., Boone
 and Smith 1998; Spencer 1997) fail to grasp the
This content downloaded from 104.129.194.195 on Thu, 19 Sep 2019 14:43:07 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 COMMENT 491
 significance of these differences, we believe a few
 points bear repeating. Rather than parrot what has
 been said before, we use somewhat different terms
 for critical concepts in order to make the signifi-
 cance of the message apparent.
 Darwinian evolutionary theory deals with his-
 tory the explanation of why certain organisms do
 better than others in a particular environment
 (Mayr 1961). As a historical science, biological
 evolution differs ontologically and metaphysically
 from the ahistorical physical sciences (e.g.,
 Lewontin 1974; Mayr 1987), though the latter
 offer explanations of how organisms function. If
 archaeology is taken to be a historical science, the
 same must hold true for it. The single most funda-
 mental difference between the historical and ahis-
 torical sciences resides in the studied phenomena
 themselves. As Ereshefsky (1992:91) points out,
 The units of evolutionary theory, taxa, are
 genealogical sequences of organisms which
 pass on historically acquired information. The
 units of chemistry and physics, on the other
 hand, do not consist of such sequences of
 objects. This difference affords evolutionary
 theory with a distinctive form of explanation ....
 In evolutionary biology, many (most?) of the
 similarities among the members of a taxon can
 be explained by those similarities being
 homologies. No such explanation is available
 for the similarities found among the units of
 physics and chemistry .... [Chemical and
 other similarities between] chunks of gold [do]
 not depend on the transmission of information
 from one chunk of gold to another [emphasis
 added].
 Simply put, Darwinian evolution, because it
 concerns heritability and continuity, comprises a
 materialist ontology, which means that it views
 relations between and among phenomena as time-
 and spacebound (Dunnell 1982; O'Brien 1996a).
 As such, it contrasts sharply with the essentialist
 ontology of the physical sciences. In essentialism,
 the "essential properties" of an object dictate
 whether it is placed in one pile or another; varia-
 tion between and among objects is viewed as noth-
 ing more than "annoying distraction" (Lewontin
 1974:5). Importantly, it is not its focus on human
 behavior that makes behavioral archaeology essen-
 tialistic; rather, it is the belief that human behavior
 can be explained by inventing nomothetic-like
 principles. Recalling the "behavioralist premise,"
 such principles allow not only the reconstruction
 of past behaviors but also the construction of
 social-behavioral theory (Schiffer 1995b:34). But
 where is the explanatory theory?
 Problems with Terms and Concepts
 Schiffer (1996:648) states that because parts of
 evolutionary archaeology are variously without
 foundation, contra modem evolutionary biology,
 these parts undermine efforts to establish a work-
 able theory. Much of Schiffer's criticism has
 roots in terminology that has plagued archaeol-
 ogy since the early 1960s. Archaeologists regu-
 larly confound the concepts of theory, hypothesis,
 model, and explanation with each other and with
 other concepts (Leonard and Reed 1996), and
 they occasionally provide differing definitions
 that range from redundant to unique.
 Evolutionary biologists routinely grapple with
 such issues (see the journal Biology and
 Philosophy), but archaeologists exacerbate the
 problem because they often do not define critical
 terms, assuming we all subconsciously share the
 same definitional perspective regarding these
 complex concepts. Schiffer's use of laws, lawlike
 statements, principles, and generalizations as
 synonyms, and ideas and theory as synonyms,
 illustrates this problem.
 Schiffer finds it odd that evolutionary archaeol-
 ogy views laws and theories as true by definition
 that is, true in terms of specifying logical
 relationships, not in some cosmological sense. We
 believe that this is odd only if one confounds the
 ideational realm with the phenomenological realm.
 Such is common in archaeology, where theory and
 hypothesis are often used synonymously. The most
 fundamental concepts underlying Darwinian evolu-
 tionary archaeology variation, inheritance, nat-
 ural selection, inclusive phenotype, replicative
 success, style, function, and so on are definition-
 ally true and relate to each other in such a way that
 evolutionary propositions about the past can be
 constructed. It is these evolutionary propositions-
 theoretical claims-about the real world that are
 testable. We call these hypotheses, which are
 derived from theory a situation wholly consistent
 with practice in modem evolutionary biology, con-
 tra Schiffer's claims. With this recognition, Schiffer
 would no longer find it surprising that "theories
 have a substantial empirical content" (Schiffer
 1996:649).
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 The Case of Analogy: Immanent and
 Configurational Properties
 Earlier we indicated that the reconstruction of cul-
 tural behavior, one basis of behavioral archaeol-
 ogy, is founded on what we view as the
 inappropriate use of analogy. We emphasize that
 we are not saying that analogy is an unacceptable
 form of reasoning. But the considerable space in
 archaeological literature devoted to discussing the
 structure of analogical reasoning and identifying
 its strengths and weaknesses (e.g., Simms 1992;
 Stahl 1993) suggests that a good many archaeolo-
 gists do not have a firm comprehension of such
 reasoning. Perhaps this should be expected, given
 that geologists (e.g., Shea 1982) and paleobiolo-
 gists (e.g., Gould 1965), too, spend a great deal of
 effort describing analogical reasoning within the
 context of discussions of uniformitarianism.
 Simpson's (1960, 1963, 1970) discussions are
 helpful in this respect, largely because he
 describes, in different terms, the sorts of linkages
 between analogical reasoning and essentialism, as
 well as the different sorts of linkages between such
 reasoning and materialism.
 What is the significance of the ontological dis-
 tinction between immanence and configuration
 when comparing behavioral and evolutionary
 archaeology? In Simpson's view, the significance
 is clear:
 The unchanging properties of matter and energy
 [chemistry, mechanics, physics] and the like-
 wise unchanging processes and principles aris-
 ing therefrom are immanent in the material
 universe. They are nonhistorical, even though
 they occur and act in the course of history. The
 actual state of the universe or of any part of it at
 a given time, its configuration, is not immanent
 and is constantly changing. It is contingent ...
 or configurational .... History may be defined
 as configurational change through time (Simp-
 son 1963:24-25).
 Simpson's "immanent" properties and
 processes compose, in our terms, essentialism; his
 "configurational" properties are historically con-
 tingent and comprise materialism. The dictum that
 "the present is the key to the past" holds only with
 respect to essentialist, or immanent, properties and
 processes: "What we know (or theorize) about the
 immanent characteristics of the universe is derived
 from observation of the present" (Simpson
 1970:8 1). Were it not for this simple fact, retrodic-
 tion and prediction would be impossible, for the
 cosmos would be truly random.
 Immanent properties and processes are what
 allow mechanical inferences to be made. The half-
 life of 14C is an immanent property that allows us
 to calculate radiocarbon dates; the validity of the
 radiocarbon-dating method hinges on the unifor-
 mitarianist assumption (analogical reasoning) that
 the half-life of 14C is the same, regardless of place
 or time. Similarly, the processes that result in bio-
 logical evolution genetic transmission, mutation,
 drift, differential reproduction and survival, and
 selection involve immanent properties and
 processes. The history of an evolutionary lineage
 is, however, configurational. Every fossil has "its
 particular as well as its general configurational
 properties, its significant balance of difference and
 resemblance [to other fossils], not only because of
 immanent properties of its constituents and imma-
 nent processes that had acted on it, but also
 because of its history, the configurational sequence
 by which these individual things arose" (Simpson
 1963:27). Thus, "[h]istoiical events, whether in the
 history of the earth, the history of life, or recorded
 human history, are determined by immanent char-
 acteristics of the universe [the source of laws] act-
 ing on and within particular configurations, and
 never by either the immanent or the configura-
 tional alone" (Simpson 1963:29).
 It is the task of the evolutionist whether study-
 ing fossils, fruit flies, or sherds to keep immanent
 and configurational characteristics separate (Szalay
 and Bock 1991). Note that we are not saying that
 evolutionists should ignore immanent properties; in
 fact, we have argued just the opposite (Lyman and
 O'Brien 1998; O'Brien and Holland 1990, 1995b;
 O'Brien et al. 1994). Failure to keep the essential-
 ist ontology and its focus on immanent properties
 distinct from configurational, or historically contin-
 gent, properties plagues other disciplines such as
 paleoecology (e.g., Lawrence 1971) a discipline
 that Schiffer (1996:650) perceives as important to
 modem evolutionary biology. But paleoecological
 inference is not straightforward when the distinc-
 tion between immanence and configuration is not
 maintained (e.g., Paine 1983; Peterson 1983). Two
 examples demonstrate that Schiffer (1996:651)
 merges the two.
 First, Schiffer (1996:650-651) cites Thomason's
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 (1995) Functional Anatomy in Vertebrate
 Paleontology as an example of the use of behavioral
 inference by evolutionary biologists, but if any-
 thing, "functional anatomy" is founded on imma-
 nent properties. We assume Schiffer realizes this,
 but his focus on function leads us to suspect that he
 tends to conflate immanent and configurational
 properties. Second, Schiffer identifies the McKellar
 principle which specifies that in fiequently main-
 tained activity areas, only small artifacts remain
 behind as primary refuse (McKellar 1983) as a
 nomothetic principle of human behavior. Simpson
 provides an excellent argument against such a prin-
 ciple being a behavioral law:
 A certain person's repeatedly picking up and
 dropping a certain stone may seem to be a
 recurrent event in all essentials, but there really
 is no applicable historical law. Abstraction of a
 law from such repeated events leads to a non-
 historical law of immanent relationships, per-
 haps in this case gravity and acceleration or
 perhaps of neurophysiology, and not to a histor-
 ical law of which this particular person, picking
 up a certain stone, at a stated moment, and
 dropping it a definite number of times would be
 a determinate instance [Simpson 1963:29-30].
 The message here is clear: the present is the key
 to the past only when immanent properties are
 involved. Despite the simplicity of what Simpson
 said, some investigators and commentators (e.g.,
 Watson 1966) have failed to grasp its significance.
 Precisely the same misunderstanding exists within
 biological taxonomy (e.g., Mayr 1987, 1996),
 despite its having been discussed in that context
 for nearly four decades (e.g., Hull 1965; LaPorte
 1997; Mayr 1959; Sober 1980).
 Analogy as Behavioral Inference
 Schiffer's (1996:656-657) discussion of "stimu-
 lated variation" and the notion that "invention is
 hardly a random process," while intriguing, is par-
 ticularly conducive to illustrating some of the dif-
 ferences between nomothetic behavioral principles
 and Darwinian evolution. In short, "stimulated
 variation" is simply another way of saying that
 necessity is the mother of invention. Evolutionary
 archaeology agrees that certain selective environ-
 ments likely do stimulate more invention than oth-
 ers, and invention is certainly not random except
 with respect to the operation of selection. But to
 invoke humankind's unique problem-solving abil-
 ities as the cause of culture change is, however, to
 limit one's analysis substantially. As Steward
 (1956:72) noted more than 30 years ago: "[A] spe-
 cific invention is not explained by saying that man
 is creative." Invoking invention, specifically as it
 relates to intent, is to view White's (1943:339)
 "urges, inherent in all living species, to live, to
 make life more secure, more rich, more full, to
 insure the perpetuation of the species" as the cata-
 lyst for change. Human intent is internal to the cul-
 tural system and results in a vitalistic evolutionism
 that is not testable because the conclusion regard-
 ing the mechanism of change is part of the theory.
 Appeal to intent as ultimate cause echoes the
 late nineteenth-century view of Darwinian evolu-
 tion. Between 1860 and 1900, one of the basic
 arguments against natural selection, expressed
 even by some of Darwin's strongest supporters-
 for example, American botanist Asa Gray was
 that it said nothing about the ultimate source of
 variation. Spencer, for example, believed the prob-
 lem with natural selection was that "it allowed the
 individual no freedom to improve itself by its own
 efforts" (Bowler 1990:171). During the early days
 of processual archaeology, the role of intent was
 seriously considered by some processualists.
 Flannery (1967:122), for example, observed that
 "individuals do make decisions, but evidence of
 these individual decisions cannot be recovered by
 archaeologists."
 We do not know how to design a valid empiri-
 cal test of stimulated variation in the prehistoric
 past. This, plus the form of evolution that results
 from invoking such mechanisms as catalysts of
 change, has prompted us and other evolutionary
 archaeologists to focus our efforts on areas other
 than the "variety-generating processes" that
 behavioral archaeology finds intriguing. Evolu-
 tionists have tended to concentrate on what hap-
 pens to variation after it is generated, instead of
 looking for laws to explain why it was generated in
 the first place. It should by now be clear that such
 laws do not exist. There is, of course, a plethora of
 mechanisms we might call upon-diffusion,
 acculturation, invention, and the like but these
 are immanent properties of how cultures work.
 Precisely how and why each of these mechanisms
 works in particular time-space-cultural contexts is,
 of course, configurational, or, as some (e.g., Beatty
 1995) prefer to label it, historically contingent.
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 Ignoring for the moment style, or selectively
 neutral features, selection is the final arbiter of what
 is transmitted and perpetuated. It is opportunistic
 and tinkers with the variation available to produce
 something that works (Jacobs 1977), regardless of
 the source of variation (O'Brien and Holland
 1995b). This point has been missed by other critics
 of evolutionary archaeology (Boone and Smith
 1998; Spencer 1997). If a workable solution cannot
 be produced by such tinkering, the organism has lit-
 tle option but to buy a tombstone. If Schiffer is look-
 ing for first principles, the closest we can get is the
 principle of contingency that what happens at
 point C is conditioned to some extent by what hap-
 pened at point B, which itself is conditioned by
 what happened at point A. This gives evolutionary
 lineages their stochastic appearance.
 Transmission
 Citing Dunnell (1978), Schiffer (1996:648) states
 that compared to genetic transmission of variation,
 "cultural transmission involves different processes
 and mechanisms, and their understanding may
 require new laws and theories." He then notes that
 this statement is self-evident to behavioralists,
 though "selectionists have been slow to follow up
 its implications with appropriate nomothetic
 research" (Schiffer 1996:648). This is true, but not
 for the reasons Schiffer implies. No one would
 argue that the study of cultural transmission is
 unimportant. Researchers such as Boyd and
 Richerson (1985) and Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman
 (1981) have made significant strides in under-
 standing the "processes and mechanisms" of cul-
 tural transmission. As yet, nothing they have
 proposed casts doubt on the application of
 Darwinian evolutionary theory to the archaeologi-
 cal record, though it has been observed that the
 strides made tend not to explain why transmission
 occurs the way that it does (Lyman and O'Brien
 1998; Sober 1992). The greatest weakness of evo-
 lutionary archaeology to date is determining how
 to measure transmission. Evolutionary biologists
 know a great deal about the processes and mecha-
 nisms of genetic transmission and the appropriate
 units-genes. Anthropologists are struggling with
 similar units variously termed "memes," "cultur-
 gens," and the like, but how these are to be
 detected archaeologically is only now being made
 clear. Applications of transmission models by evo-
 lutionary archaeologists suggest this may, for a
 time, be an empirical matter (e.g., Lipo et al. 1997;
 Neiman 1995).
 We agree with Schiffer (1996:648) that it is
 important to distinguish between the processes
 that give rise to variation and those that result in
 the differential persistence of certain variants as
 opposed to others. In cultural systems, variation
 results in part from differences in human percep-
 tion and intention. In fact, Rindos (1985, 1986)
 argued that if there is a genetic capacity for cul-
 ture, it actually is a capacity for intentional behav-
 ior. Cultural systems, similar to organisms, tend to
 be overbuilt. That is, they tend to be plastic, adap-
 tive systems capable of accomplishing much more
 than they regularly do (Boone and Smith 1998).
 Lability was, no doubt, built by selection (Gould
 1991). Efforts to ascribe a function to every
 attribute of the archaeological record fail to recog-
 nize, for example, that the human organism uses
 only a fraction of its brain power, just as a com-
 puter can do much more than we ask of it. Such
 spandrels metaphorically, architectural features
 resulting from design requirements but with no
 immediate function (Gould and Lewontin 1979;
 see also Gans 1988) serve as a stockpile of vari-
 ation in some respects stylistic, or adaptively
 neutral, because they were not shaped by selection
 but rather by design requirements that may, in a
 fluctuating selective environment, be co-opted for
 some future function (Gould and Vrba 1982).
 Herein may reside much of what evolutionary
 archaeology terms style (Dunnell 1978).
 Gould (1991) argues that system lability, with
 particular reference to our overbuilt brains, is cru-
 cial to an evolutionary psychology. Fully in concert
 with a Darwinian viewpoint (Gans 1988; Mayr
 1991), we can propose that self-awareness is a
 spandrel, an unintended outcome of selection hav-
 ing produced a somatic central-processing unit
 that, in the last 30 years, has built similar units from
 plastic, metal, and glass. Add reading, writing, lan-
 guage, and other uniquely human or cultural attrib-
 utes to the list of human-associated traits, many of
 which may have begun as spandrels. If the last is
 true, then "[s]tructural consequences have out-
 stripped original bases" (Gould 1991:59). We sus-
 pect that those archaeologists with leanings toward
 the various postprocessual programs could help us
 gain significant insights here.
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 Concluding Remarks
 Behavioral archaeology originally sought to
 replace culture history and cultural reconstruction
 and to improve on processual archaeology. It is
 underlain by an essentialist ontology, which holds
 that human behavior, regardless of time or space,
 has configurational properties that all members of
 the species possess. In such a view, the configura-
 tional present is the key to the configurational past.
 The evolutionary program is underlain by a materi-
 alist ontology, which holds that things are always in
 the process of becoming something else. In such a
 historical view, the configurational present is not
 and cannot be the key to the configurational past.
 Temporal and spatial context matter a great deal.
 Only immanent properties can be keys to the his-
 torical particulars of the past (Lyman and O'Brien
 1998). Scientists are free to pose whatever kinds of
 questions they wish, though logic dictates that the
 kinds of questions they ask be derived naturally
 from the kind of science being practiced. When that
 science is Darwinian evolution, the questions must
 be of the historical (configurational, contingent,
 materialist) kind. The last is not to say that essen-
 tialism and immanent properties do not have a role
 to play, because they certainly do. And, at the risk
 of sounding redundant, it is behavioralists such as
 Schiffer (e.g., Schiffer and Skibo 1987; Schiffer et
 al. 1994; Skibo et al. 1989; Vaz Pinto et al. 1987)
 who have made many of the important strides in
 understanding the nature of immanent properties.
 We agree with Dunnell (1989) that one grand the-
 ory generates all of a field's hypotheses and links all
 explanations. Given our interest in studying the evo-
 lutionary history of cultures, the most workable the-
 ory is Darwinian evolutionism. Schiffer (1996)
 states, perhaps facetiously, that "[a]pparently, then,
 evolutionary theory alone can solve archaeology's
 myriad explanatory problems." To this we answer,
 No, it cannot. It can, however, solve archaeology's
 evolutionary problems. To this end, evolutionary
 archaeology has constructed concepts and principles
 to make the theory applicable to the archaeological
 record. Most fundamentally, artifacts, as well as
 behaviors that created them, are conceived of as
 being part of the human phenotype. The concepts of
 replicative success, style, and function are also nec-
 essary inclusions. In our view, modem Darwinian
 evolutionary theory dictates appropriate methods.
 This is not to say that behavioral archaeology
 does not have significant things to contribute to an
 evolutionary theory, because it does a point we
 have made in the past (O'Brien and Holland
 1995b). Other programs, in particular evolutionary
 ecology (see papers in Maschner 1996) and post-
 processualism, given the latter's interest in the
 symbolic, also have important contributions to
 make. However, before a truly integrative
 approach to the historical study of humans and
 their artifacts emerges-that is, one that investi-
 gates the evolutionary pathways of humans and the
 groups in which they live we must make clear
 what the points of contention are among the vari-
 ous approaches. This of necessity will dictate that
 all interested parties, ourselves included, make
 sure that we understand the underlying premises of
 the various approaches in detail.
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